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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-3607
________________
RYAN JAY PETTEY,
                                      Appellant
v.
WARDEN JAMES SHERMAN
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-0131)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action 
Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 1, 2007
Before: RENDELL, SMITH AND JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed : March 20, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Ryan Pettey appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because Pettey’s appeal presents no
substantial question, we will grant the Government’s motion for summary affirmance.
2In 2000, Pettey was convicted by a Michigan state court of possession with intent
to deliver cocaine and sentenced to 14-240 months of imprisonment.  On May 21, 2001,
the Michigan Parole Board determined that Pettey was an appropriate candidate for parole
with an expected parole date of September 26, 2001.  On September 13, 2001, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) informed the Michigan Department of Corrections that
Pettey was under investigation for his participation in a drug conspiracy which resulted in
multiple murders and requested to be notified if he were released.  As a result of the
information provided by the FBI, Pettey’s parole date was suspended.  Eventually, in
October 2002, Pettey was indicted in federal court on charges.  Based on the new
information regarding Pettey’s participation in a violent drug conspiracy, the Michigan
Parole Board suspended Pettey’s parole date and eventually revoked his grant of parole.   
On October 25, 2001, Pettey was “borrowed” by federal authorities pursuant to a
federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.  In May 2002, Pettey pleaded guilty to
one count of interstate travel in aid of racketeering and was sentenced to 60 months’
imprisonment to be served consecutively to his state sentence.  On August 22, 2002,
Pettey was returned to state custody to serve the remainder of his state sentence.  In
September 2002, and again in 2003, Pettey was denied parole by the Michigan Parole
Board.
In 2003, Pettey was “borrowed” by federal authorities twice more – from
September 22 to October 6 and from November 6 to November 28.  Finally, on March 5,
32004, Pettey was paroled into federal custody to begin serving his federal sentence.  He
was not awarded any time for his prior custody against his federal sentence.  
In May 2005, Pettey filed this petition for habeas corpus in the Western District of
Pennsylvania.   In it, he claimed that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) should credit
him with time served against his sentence for all of the time after he was denied release
on parole, because he was held in Michigan state custody solely because of a federal
detainer.  He also claims that he should be credited with all of the time that he was
“borrowed” by federal authorities.  The Magistrate Judge held that he was not entitled to
credit against his federal detention for any of the time that he spent in prison before
March 5, 2004.  The District Judge adopted the report and recommendation, and Pettey
appealed.
 A federal prisoner is statutorily entitled to credit for time spent in official
detention prior to the date his federal sentence commences that resulted from: (1) the
offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) any other charge for which the
defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed, but only if that time has not been credited against another sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b).  Pettey’s federal sentence commenced on March 4, 2004, and the BOP is
barred from crediting him with any of the time he spent in custody that had been credited
against his state sentence.  See id.; United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992).  
Pettey’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  He claims that he should be
credited with the time that he served on his Michigan sentence after his parole was
revoked because that part of his state sentence was “exclusively the product of [] action
by federal law enforcement officials as to justify treating the state jail as the practical
equivalent of a federal one.”  (Mem. of Law in Support of Habeas Pet. at 4) (quoting
Davis v. Attorney General, 425 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1970) (interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3658(repealed))).  However, the facts of his case clearly show that Pettey’s parole was
not revoked due to a federal detainer that prevented the state authorities from releasing
him.  Rather the Michigan Parole Commission, acting on new information regarding his
involvement in other crimes, determined that Pettey was not a good candidate for parole. 
Pettey is also not entitled to credit against his federal sentence for time he spent in federal
custody when he was “borrowed” pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. 
See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000).
In short, we conclude that his appeal presents us with no substantial question.  See
Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, Accordingly, we grant the
Government’s motion for summary affirmance and will affirm the District Court’s order. 
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